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THE "RIGHT TO COUNSEL"
IN POLITICAL CASES:
THE BAR'S FAILURE
DAVID GOLDBERGER*
Throughout American history, the few lawyers willing to appear in un-
popular political cases have been forced to endure blistering personal and
professional attacks for their efforts. These attacks continue today. In the face
of such attacks, the vast majority of American lawyers avoid political cases.
Most lawyers support. the attacks-either by actually joining in the attacks or
by looking the other way when others make them. Unless there is a change in
the bar's attitude and conduct, unpopular political clients will face a severe
shortage of competent legal representation because very few able lawyers will
be willing to endure the attacks.
To illustrate my point, I would like to refer to my own experience in the
Skokie case.' In that case, a small group of self-styled Nazis sought to picket
the village hall in Skokie, Illinois, a predominantly Jewish community. Skokie
became the subject of intense public interest because it is the residence of a
comparatively large number of concentration camp survivors and survivors of
Nazi-occupied Europe. The Nazis stated that all they planned to do was to pro-
test an insurance bond requirement blocking their use of Skokie's public
parks. They planned to appear in storm trooper uniforms and display the
swastika.
Four days prior to the scheduled assembly, the village of Skokie filed suit,
seeking an injunction barring the uniforms, the swastika, and all potentially
offensive language. The strategy behind the litigation appeared to be that if
the paraphernalia were barred, the group itself would stay at home.
Late in the evening of the day the suit was filed, I received a phone call
from the leader of the Nazi group, who requested representation by the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in court the next morning. I
conferred with appropriate officials of the ACLU Illinois Division about
whether we should take the case. We rapidly concluded that the case posed
classic first amendment questions, leaving us with no choice but to take it.
* Legal Director, ACLU, Illinois Divison.
1. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Village of
Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 69 1ll.2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978); Goldstein v. Collin, No. 50176 (Il. Jan. 27.
1978); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978).
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I then made several efforts to find a volunteer attorney to take the case.
Each person I asked refused because of the short notice or because of distaste
for the client. At that point, the hour was growing late; and it was quite clear
that no one but 1, teamed with a part-time volunteer attorney, was willing or
able to appear in the case. We (lid so the following morning. An injunction
was issued that afternoon against any assembly in which the party members
appeared with uniforms, swastikas, or literature.
The reaction of the community to the ACLU taking the case was
predictably hostile. After all, what could be a more offensive client of fact sit-
uation in a first amendment case? The Chicago ACLU office was swamped
with angry telephone calls, letters of resignation, and ultimately some threats
of violence. It is my understanding that some people opposing our represen-
tation quietly approached ACLU funding sources to discourage donations and
grants.
More disturbing, however, was the reaction of the bar. First I must
ernphasize-thankfully-that a small number of lawyers who had supported
the ACLU for a long time understood the responsibility of the bar to appear
in unpopular cases: they provided as solid a base of support as they could.
Unfortunately, their support was dwarfed by the reaction of the vast major-
ity of the members of the bar who expressed either indifference or outright
hostility because the ACLU had provided counsel. All bar associations stood
by silently.
Several attorneys resigned from the Illinois ACLU in anger as soon as they
learned of our involvement. For example, a former state official resigned,
stating that he did not believe the organization should defend individuals or
groups whose philosophy is not consistent with democracy. He avoided the
question of whether the conduct was lawfully protected by the first amendent.
When the case was discussed at a meeting of a group of lawyers in private
practice, many of them, including a municipal court judge, vigorously ex-
pressed the sentiment that the case should never have been taken by the
ACLU. They said that if the Nazis had gone unrepresented, an injunction
would have been issued against its activities and no one would have paid any
attention to the matter. Instead, these lawyers complained, the ACLU's provi-
sion of counsel had made the group too newsworthy.
Because of the tradition of the criminal defense bar of providing representa-
tion in unpopular criminal cases, it was assumed that its members in particular
would understand and actively support the ACLU's decision to provide coun-
sel. Therefore, the ACLU sent a letter to a number of criminal defense attor-
neys in Chicago, seeking their support in hopes of offsetting the criticism and
membership losses that had been generated by the case. The letter quoted the
ethical consideration of the Canons of Ethics, which requires lawyers to ap-
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pear in unpopular cases.' The response was silence. A criminal court judge
later observed privately that the criminal defense bar was not sympathetic to
defense efforts in the Skokie case because most members of the criminalbar
found the client's views intolerable.
Former Attorney General Edward Levi, a University of Chicago law pro-
fessor, broke his agreement to put his name on a public statement urging
people not to abandon the ACLU solely because of the Skokie case. Levi
justified this refusal on grounds that he was not an ACLU member.
As the most visible lawyer in the case, I came in for a substantial share of
the criticism and vituperation. In one court document, I was called "neo-Nazi
counsel."' (When I objected, the lawyer who made the statement assured me
that he meant only "counsel for the neo-Nazis." He said it was like calling
counsel for a labor union a "union lawyer.") Personally insulting telephone
calls poured into my office. When I appeared at speaking engagements, I was
repeatedly called a Nazi sympathizer or a dupe. At one speaking engagement
at a synagogue in Gary, Indiana, a small radical political group attempted to
disrupt the program long enough to present me with an award for being
"Nazi of the Year."
As of the date of this speech, no organized bar group has made a state-
ment or suggestion that the appearance of counsel in the case was constitu-
tionally necessary or, for that matter, ethically proper. None has even consid-
ered the question.
A cursory reading of the Canons of Ethics and of American judicial his-
tory suggests that the right to counsel even in unpopular political cases is so
settled a question that the organized bar should have become concerned as
soon as the criticism began to mount. The Canons of Ethics are quite articu-
late on the subject. The Canons contain an ethical consideration that states,
among other things, "Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should not
decline representation because a client or a cause is unpoplar or a community
reaction is adverse."5 This statement, of course, is hedged by other statements
making it clear that "a lawyer is under no [legal] obligation to act as advisor
or advocate for every person."' Nonetheless, the ethical consideration sets out
an ideal against which the bar is presumed to measure its conduct.
The importance of counsel in political cases hardly needs to be discussed.
The adversary system is premised on the notion that sound judicial decisions
2. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, 2-27 (1969).
3. Goldstein v. Collin, 77 CH 4367 (Cook County Circuit Court) (plaintiff's motion to quash
deposition, JulyN 7, 1977).
4. Supra note 3. Oral argument in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, Sept. 1, 1977
and telephone conversation with counsel.
5. Supra note 2.
6. Id. § 2-26.
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are products of cases vigorously contested on all sides. To permit a political
dissident to go through the court system without a lawyer or with inept repre-
sentation can generate only poor decisions. This should be a troubling pros-
pect, particularly in cases that turn on vital constitutional questions. Thus, in
the words of Justice Hugo Black, "Just as a democratic society needs legisla-
tors willing and able to criticize national and state policy, so it needs lawyers
who will defend unpopular causes and champion unpopular clients."
7
The principle that underlies the portion of the Canons of Ethics encourag-
ing lawyers to undertake the representation of unpopular clients is rooted
deeply in English tradition. The English actually forbid their barristers from
declining to provide representation in cases in which they have basic
expertise."
E. V. Rostow, former dean of the Yale Law School, tells us that the obliga-
tion of the English barrister to undertake any case tendered to him was ac-
knowledged in Scotland as early as the sixteenth century. 9 As to England, he
quotes Sir Hartley Shawcross, former chairman of the General Council of the
English Bar, who observed that:
It arose in 1792 over the prosecution of Tom Paine for publishing the second
part of his Rights of Man. The great advocate Erskine, who accepted the re-
tainer to defend Paine and was deprived of his Office as Attorney General to
the Prince of Wales for doing so, said-and said truly-in a famous speech:
"From the moment that any advocate can be permitted to say that he will or
will not stand between the Crown and the subject arraigned in the court
where he daily sits to practice, from that moment the liberties of England are
at an end."" °
In the American colonies, it appeared superficially that there was to be
deference paid to the English tradition. For example, there is the timeworn
story of the courage of John Adams at the time of the Boston Massacre. Sev-
eral colonists had been killed by British soldiers during a shooting incident
that the colonists believed tantamount to cold-blooded murder."1 A Captain
Prescott was thought to have ordered a group of British soldiers to fire, lead-
ing to the killings. Adams was asked to defend Prescott, who vigorously denied
giving the order."2 In the face of intense public outrage, Adams agreed to un-
dertake the defense and announced his intentions openly. 3 His defense was
successful.
7. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154. 180 (1971)
(Black, J., dissenting).
8. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 139 (1953).
9. Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client, 48 A.B.A.J. 25, 29 (1962).
10. The Times (London), Feb. 19, 1953, at 4, col. 3.
11. See Report of the Committee of the Town of Boston to Thomas Pownall (March 12,
1770), reprinted in F. KIDDER, HISTORY OF THE BOSTON MASSACRE 21-23 (1870).
12. See H. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 216 (1970).
13. See generali, 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 293-95 (L. Butterfield ed.
1961).
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There are other prominent examples of adherence to the tradition that a
lawyer has an ethical obligation to appear in unpopular cases. For example,
there is the case in which the Maryland lawyer Roger Taney represented Pas-
tor Gruber, a Methodist minister who had sermonized against slavery while
attending a camp meeting in Washington County, Maryland. 4 At the time,
Maryland was a slave state, and abolitionist views were considered an anath-
ema to public order. The minister was indicted on charges that his speech was
an incitation of slaves to insurrection. Taney undertook the defense on behalf
of Pastor Gruber in the face of enormous public hostility throughout the
state; he won an acquittal.'-
Unfortunately, these examples of lawyers' individual commitment to the
principle of the bar's obligation to appear in unpopular cases are the excep-
tion rather than the rule. For the most part, the English tradition never took
root in America, and members of the private bar have assiduously avoided in-
volvement in political cases like the Skokie suit.
One of the most embarrassing examples of the bar's treatment of contro-
versial political cases occurred during the McCarthy period. Defense of com-
munists under the various anticommunist laws of the period was shunned by
the bar and was left to a few lonely lawyers who, for lack of adequate
alternatives, had to appear in case after case.' 6 As a result, they quickly be-
came identified with their clients, reducing their effectiveness. In an article
published in 1961, Leon Jaworski noted the disturbing nature of the bar's
treatment of the communist cases: "Particularly disquieting is the growing
tendency of members of the Bar to shun the acceptance of representation on
the side that meets with public disfavor."' 7
For a time it seemed that the problem of representation in unpopular
cases might be addressed systematically when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
in Gideon v. Wainwright 8 that indigent criminal defendants have a constitu-
tional right to counsel. To no one's surprise, the Court's decision generated
no moral rebirth among members of the private bar. Rather, it resulted in the
creation of large court-supervised public defender organizations which were
insulated from criticism and attack by public funding.
Gideon did not create a right to counsel for indigents in civil cases, so the
Johnson administration's "War on Poverty" created the federally funded legal
aid program that ultimately became the Legal Services Corporation. Like pub-
lic defenders, legal aid lawyers found insulation from attack in controversial
cases in public funding. Not that the insulation is complete. During the Nixon
administration, for example, Congress made strenuous efforts to limit tile abil-
14. See, e.g., W. LEVwIS, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR 76-77 (1965).
15. Id. at 77.
16. See C. BFLFRAGc. THE AMERICAN INQUISITION, 1945-1960, at 177 (1973).
17. Jaworski, The Unpopular Case, 47 A.B.A.J. 714. 714 (1962).
18. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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ity of legal services attorneys to sue the government.' 9 These were largely
unsuccessful. However, legal services lawyers are presently barred from repre-
senting women desiring elective abortions in cases challenging the validity of
anti-abortion laws. 20
When the Skokie case arose, the Nazis who were named as defendants nei-
ther qualified for legal aid nor for the public defender. They therefore had
to turn to the private bar, where the response was as I have already described.
Admittedly, the problems of American dissidents may appear insubstantial
to many in comparison to problems of dissidents in countries governed by
dictatorships. However, the undoubtedly true horror stories about the prob-
lems of dissidents abroad should not be permitted to obscure the seriousness
of problems in the United States.
There are great costs imposed by the American bar's hostility or indiffer-
ence towards the problems in representing dissidents. The most obvious and
important one is as I have already stated: truly unpopular dissidents simply
may be denied access to legal representation. This point hardly needs elabora-
tion. Almost every member of the private bar confronted with the possibility
of losing clients whose fees guarantee a livelihood or suffering public vilifica-
tion for representing an unpopular client will refuse such representation.
Another cost of bar indifference in political cases is debilitation of basic
civil liberties. The public looks to the bar as an example and as a source of in-
formation on civil liberties questions. To the extent that the bar ignores or at-
tacks its own members in difficult civil liberties cases, the public is taught to
do the same thing. How can we then expect the public to embrace basic civil
rights, such as the right to counsel, when the bar apparently does not?
Finally, there is the cost of the bar's hostility and indifference to the judi-
cial process. Failure of the organized bar to support the work of attorneys in
unpopular cases not only exposes those attorneys to attack but also exposes
the courts to attack. It is one short step from vilifying the ACLU and its law-
yers for advocating and defending first amendment rights to vilifying the
courts for upholding those rights. In fact, it was only a few years ago that the
American Bar Association attacked the Supreme Court for civil liberties rul-
ings, compelling Chief Justice Warren's resignation from the association.
What can and should the organized bar do in the face of such a long
record of hostility or indifference? The answers are clear. The organized bar
must:
1. Speak out publicly on behalf of lawyers who appear in extremely unpopular
cases. The bar's silence and the attacks by its members are intolerable
for the reasons I have already explained. The organized bar, therefore,
must establish a policy of routinely issuing public resolutions and state-
19. See 119 CONG. REC. 20685, 20736-20740 (1973).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f.
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ments on behalf of the right to counsel in particular cases whenever
necessary. It should not wait to be asked. A repudiated request for help
is even more damaging than silence-the requests will therefore never
materialize.
2. Financially support the civil liberties organizations when possible. After all,
those are the organizations that frequently fill the void in the availability
of counsel in political cases created by the ideological preferences or
business necessities of members of the private bar.
3. Explain, even in private conversations with nonlawyers, the importance of the
right to counsel in unpopular cases. There is no better way to communicate
the importance of the right to counsel-especially in the more distaste-
ful cases-than on a one-to-one basis. Bar members must take time to
educate the public about the right to counsel and the related duties of
lawyers.
4. Stop avoiding appearing in unpopular cases as a matter of course. This pro-
posal is the most obvious and least palatable approach. The Canons of
Ethics make the responsibility clear. Undertaking the responsibility is
the most direct remedy to the present state of affairs. The bar might
even consider adopting the English approach and limiting the discretion
of lawyers to reject such cases.
In spite of these suggestions, continued failure of the bar to reconsider its
traditional posture of inaction or hostility in political cases is probably to be
expected. It seems as if the only thing capable of stirring the American bar is
Chief Justice Warren Burger's assertion that many lawyers are incompetent in
the courtroom. Nonetheless, because the strength of the Bill of Rights de-
pends, in large part, on the commitment of the American bar to it, one can
always hope that the bar one day will choose to measure up to the ideal that it
claims to espouse.
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